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Trade in Risky Assets
ABSTRACT
This paper develops a theory of the international trade pattern in
risky assets by applying the law of comparative advantage to asset trade.
According to this law there is a tendency for a country to import assets that
have relatively high autarky prices. The autarky price of an asset is high
if the autarky real interest rate is low, or if the assetts autarky risk
measure (the product of the risk premium and the asset price) is low. It is
examined how autarky interest rates and risk measures are affected by
international differences in (i) stochastic properties of output/endowments,
(ii) the rate of time preference, (iii) the degree of risk aversion, and (iv)
subjective beliefs, and how such differences predict overall capital account
deficits or surpluses as well as the composition of the capital account into
trade in arbitrary risky assets and the special cases of sure indexed bonds,








This paper develops a simple but general theory of the determinants of
the international pattern of trade in risky assets. The importance of
international trade in risky assets is obvious, with increased liberalization
of international capital movements, and with the observation that in practice
all assets are risky in the sense that their real returns are uncertain.1
Yet it seems that there is much less research done on the pattern of trade in
explicitly risky assets than on the pattern of trade in goods.
The theory is developed by borrowing from and synthesizing several
strands of literature. We start from the modern formulations of standard
international trade theory, more precisely the general law of comparative
advantage as developed by Deardorff (1980) and Dixit and Norman (1980).
According to the law of comparative advantage there is a positive correlation
between a country's net import of goods and the country's autarky prices
relative to world prices (or relative to autarky prices in the rest of the
world), such that on average a country is a net importer of goods for which
autarky prices are relatively high. With only two goods, the law of
comparative advantage provides an exact relation between the trade pattern
and relative autarky prices. With more than two goods, it provides only a
correlation between the vectors of net import and relative autarky prices,
and it does not provide an exact relation for each individual good.
It is well known that the standard trade theory can be extended to an
1 Stocks and equities are obviously risky assets, but so are all nominal
bonds in any currency since there is exchange rate and price level risk.
Exchange rate risk makes even very short-term bank deposits risky. A
non-risky asset would be a hypothetical appropriately indexed (to some
consumer price index, say) short-term deposit. Even such an asset is not
sure in utility terms (see footnote 16).2
intertemporal theory of international borrowing and lending, by interpreting
commodities as dated goods. The law of comparative advantage then implies
that a country will on average have a trade surplus in periods for which the
autarky present value of goods is relatively high, that is, for which autarky
interest rates are relatively low.2 It is also clear that the standard trade
theory can be extended to the case with uncertainty, where goods are
distinguished by the state of the world in which they occur.3 The principle
of comparative advantage then says that a country will on average import
goods in states for which the autarky prices for Arrow-Debreu securities,
that is, state-contingent deliveries, are relatively high.
A special case of trade in risky assets has received considerable
interest. This is trade in claims to firms' profits, equity. After
pioneering work by Helpman and Razin (1978), a number of papers have recently
examined the effects on trade in equities on welfare, resource allocation,
and the goods trade pattern.4
Here we will reformulate the law of comparative advantage so as to
cover the case of trade in any arbitrarily specified set of assets, complete
or incomplete.5 This will allow us to include as special cases trade in sure
2 For an explicit statement of the intertemporal extension of the
standard trade theory, see Persson and Stockman (1987).
3 See Pomery (1984), Helpinan (1985a), and Persson and Stockman (1987).
See for instance Pomery (1984) andlaterwork by Helpman (1985a,b) and
Grossman and Razin (1984, 1985). Cole (1986) examines the effect of trade in
different kinds of assets (ex post securities, Arrow-Debreu state-contingent
deliveries, and Helprnan-Razin equities) on variance and covariance of key
real variables, like output, consumption, arid trade balance.
5 The set of assets is complete (incomplete) in the usual sense of having
at least as many (fewer) linearly independant assets as (than) the number of
states of the world.3
indexed bonds, trade in Arrow-Debreu securities, and trade in equities, or
rather claims to firmst output (we shall make a simplifying assumption of
exogenous stochastic outputs/endowments and no inputs, so as to be able to
disregard the effect of trade in assets on production decisions, in which
case claims to profit and claims to output coincide).
In standard trade theory, there are basically two approaches to examine
the determinants of the trade pattern. One, the comparative advantage
approach, is to start from the law of comparative advantage and its emphasis
on autarky price differences, and then to go behind the autarky price
differences and explain how these are caused by underlying differences
between countries with respect to technology, endowments, preferences, or
other characteristics. The other, the "direct" approach, is to look directly
at trade equilibria without any reference to autarky prices, and infer how
differences between countries directly determine the trade patter. Whereas
the autarky prices approach was common in the early work on the goods trade
pattern,6 the direct approach has more recently been the dominant one, both
in standard trade theory and in the literature on trade in equities referred
to above.7
There is, however, a special reason for basing a theory of the trade
pattern for risky assets on relative autarky prices. The reason is that we
can borrow from the general-equilibrium asset-pricing theory developed by
6 Seefor instance the classic paper by Jones (1956).
7 Forexamples of use of the direct approach to the determinants of the
pattern of trade, see Deardorff (1982), the survey by Ethier (1984), Dixit
and Woodland (1982) and Markusen and Svensson (1985) for trade in goods, and
Svensson (1984) and Ethier and Svensson (1986) for trade in goods and
factors.4
Lucas (1978), Breeden (1979), and others. It turns out to be very convenient.
to use this theory in order to express autarky asset prices in terms of
autarky real interest rates and risk premia. Our work is hence closely
related to international applications of this asset pricing theory, for
instance Lucas (1982), Stulz (1981, 1984), Svensson (1985) and Stockman and
Svensson (1987). That literature has focused on the determinants of prices
on internationally traded risky assets, but not examined the trade pattern in
risky assets in itself. In the typical set-up, as in Lucas (1982), there is
trade in the outside assets, namely claims to output (equities), currencies
and claims to government transfers. Since representative consumers with
identical preferences are assumed, there is no trade in other, inside assets
(which does not prevent any arbitrary inside asset to be priced, however).
Furthermore, the trade pattern in the existing outside assets is trivial,
since a perfectly pooled equilibrium is assumed, in which all investors hold
the same portfolio.8 In our analysis, equilibria will
8 That is, relative to autarky each country (in a two-country world)
exports half of its assets and imports half of the other country's assets.
Still, capital movements, and correlations between key macro variables like
investment, the current account, output, etc., can be studied, as in Stockman
and Svensson (1987), but any current and capital account movements are due
exclusively to revaluation of domestically based assets relative to foreign
based assets, not to changes in the ownershiD of assets.
Dumas (1986) considers a model whith two investors with different
degrees of risk aversion where the investors' portfolios are revised over
time and asset trades between them occur. Stockman and Dellas (1986) and
Stulz (1986) consider international asset pricing models with nontraded
goods, where consumers do not have perfectly pooled equilibria but hold a
larger share of domestic assets. Their focus is exclusively on equilibrium
asset price and exchange rate determination and variability. Stockman and
Hernandez (1986) utilize an international asset pricing model to demonstrate
that the effect on policy like capital controls depends crucially on whether
the private sector can hedge against the policy by trading in risky assets
(in their case Arrow-Debreu securities). Gordon and Varian (1986) discuss
welfare effects of taxes on internationally traded risky assets in a CAPM
model and examine the analog to the optimum tariff result for trade in goods.5
generally not be perfectly pooled.
We mentioned that our theory is general in the sense of covering any
arbitrary complete or incomplete set of assets, including as special cases
sure indexed bonds, equities and claims on output (stocks), and Arrow-Debreu
securities. Also, our theory includes the determinants of the aggregate
current account and capital account, hence aggregate international borrowing
and lending, as well as the composition of the capital account, the trade in
individual assets (subject to the qualification that when there are many
assets results are in the form of correlations and hold on average, but not
exactly for each individual asset).
The first step in our method is to express the autarky asset price for
a given asset in terms of the autarky real interest rate and the autarky risk
measure (the risk measure is the product of the risk premium and the asset
price). Differences in countries' autarky real interest rates affect the
autarky prices of and trade in all assets, and are related to whether a
country has an overall capital account deficit or surplus and hence is a net
lender or borrower. A country with a relatively low autarky real interest
rate has a tendency to have an overall capital account deficit and be a net
lender. Differences in autarky risk measures are specific to individual
assets and are related to the trade in individual assets. A country with a
relatively low autarky risk measure for an asset (that is, for which an asset
is relatively less risky) has a tendency to import that asset.
The second step is to examine what determines the differences between
countries' autarky real interest rates and risk measures. We will look at
the effect on autarky real interest rates and risk measures of differences
between countries with respect to technology, endowments and preferences, or6
more precisely (i) the stochastic properties of output/endowments, (ii) the
rate of time preference, (iii) the degree of risk aversion, and (iv)
expectations (subjective probability beliefs).
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 deal with
preliminaries and can be skimmed by readers not interested in the standard
derivation of the law of comparative advantage. Section 2 describes the
model, the equilibrium for a single country, and demonstrates gains from
trade in risky assets. Section 3 describes a world equilibrium with two
countries and derives the law of comparative advantage for trade in risky
assets. Section 4, the core of the paper, discusses the determination of
autarky asset prices, derives the effect of cross-country differences in
technology/endowments and preferences on autarky real interest rates and risk
measures, and finds the trade pattern for arbitrary assets as well as the
special cases of sure bonds, stocks, and Arrow-Debreu securities. Section 5
concludes.
The results are summarized in a highlighted paragraph at the end of
each subsection of section 4. Reading just those paragraphs gives an
overview of the results.
2. Equilibrium in a Single Country and Gains from Asset Trade
We consider a situation with one good and two periods. There are two
countries, home and foreign, in the world. Period 1 outputs in the home and
foreign country, y1 and y*l are exogenous, and deterministic. Period 2
outputs in the two countries, y2 and y2, are also exogenous, but stochastic.
We call the vector s =(y2,y*2)the state of the world in period 2. Goods
are perishable and there is no storage or other investment technology.
There is a given set J of J different assets. (We let J denote both
the set and the number of elements of the set.) These assets are traded on a7
world asset market in period 1, before the uncertainty about the state of the
world in period 2 is resolved. Each asset j E J is characterized by a given
(gross real) return function R(s) which expresses the gross real returns
paid in the one good as a function of state s in period 2. Returns are not
necessarily positive in all states.
Let us look at some special assets. First, the sure bond pays one unit
of the good in each state. It is identified with j =0and is defined by
(2.la) R0(s) =1for for all s.
A second special case is trade in stocks. Let us identify home and foreign
stocks (claims to home and foreign period 2 output, respectively) as assets
j =hand j =f,defined by the return functions
(2.lb) Rh(s) =y2and ltf(s) =y2for all
Third, the Arrow-Debreu securities are the set of assets that each pay one
unit of the good in one specific state only. We identify the Arrow-Debreu
security for state s with j =s,for all s. It is defined by
(2.lc) R5(o-) =1for q= s,R5(o) =0for all c s.
Let S be the (finite or infinite) number of different states of the
world. In standard terminology, the asset market is said to be complete if
the set J of assets is such that there are S linearly independent assets
(that is, there are S linearly independent return functions). Then agents
canreachthe same consumption bundle across states via trade in the
available assets as they can via trade in the S Arrow-Debreu securities. If
there are fewer than S linearly independent assets, the asset market is said
to be incomplete. Our analysis does not presume that the asset market is
complete or that trade in Arrow-Debreu securities is feasible, but
incorporates these possibilities as special cases. Below, we shall sometimes
assume that the state of the world is bivariate normally distributed. Then,8
whenever the number of assets is finite, the asset market is incomplete.
Let us now consider the home country. It has a representative consumer
who is entitled to home output in the two periods. The consumer has a
subjective probability distribution function F(s) over the states of the
world. The consumer has preferences over period 1 consumption, c1, and
state-dependant period 2 consumption, c2(s). The preferences can be
represented by the additively separable expected utility function
(2.2) U(c1) +
whereU(.) is a standard increasing concave sufficiently differentiable von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, fi>0is is the subjective discount
factor, and E[x] denotes the subjective expected value Jx(s)dF(s).9
Let m denote (net) import of period 1 goods, and let the J-vector
z =
(zj)jEJ
denote (net) import of the J assets from the world asset market
in period 1. Then period 1 consumption and period 2 consumption in state s
are given by'°
(2.3a) c1 =y1+mand
(2.3b) c2(s) = +
It is practical to define preferences directly over import of period 1 goods
and assets. Substitution of (2.3) into (2.2) allows us to define the trade
utility function U(m,z) by
(2.4) U(m,z)U(y1 +m)+flE{U(y2+
Letp and q =(cI)j
denote the price of period 1 goods and the J- vector of
9 Asis well known, representing preferences by an additively separable
expected utility function does not allow a separation between risk aversion
and intertemporal substitution in consumption (see Selden (1978, 1979)).
Whendiscussing differences in risk aversion, we shall actually use Selden's
formulationto separate risk aversion from intertemporal substitution.
10 Wedisregard bankruptcy issues, by not restricting consumption to be
non- negative.9
asset prices. It is convenient to define the balance-of-payments (deficit)
function B(p,q,u) as the minimum expenditure on import of goods and assets
required to reach a given utility level. That is,
(2.5) B(p,q,u) =min{pm+ qz U(m,z) ￿ u},
where qz denotes the inner product (The balance-of-payments
fullction is simply the standard expenditure function minus the value of
period 1 output.)'1
In the rest of the paper we will take period 1 goods to be the
nuineraire, p =1,and hence express asset prices q in terms of period 1
goods.
It is now easy to represent a trade equilibrium for the economy, an
equilibrium in which the economy faces a given vector of asset prices q on






Equation (2.6) says that the balance of payments is zero in equilibrium,
whereas equations (2.7a) and (2.7b) express import of goods and assets as the
derivative of the balance-of-payments function with respect to the price of
period 1 goods and asset prices respectively, exploiting standard properties
of expenditure functions. For given world asset prices qt, equations (2.6)
and (2.7) can be solved for the corresponding home utility level u and the
11 This function occurs in the literature under a variety of names. See
Lloyd and Schweinberger (1986) for references to its use in previous
literature.10
import m and z of goods and assets.12
An autarky eiuilibrium, an equilibrium without access to the world
asset market, is given by the equations (2.6) and
(2.8) Bq(l,q,u) =0,
the latter stating that the import of assets is zero. (Import of period 1
goods is then also zero, B(1,q,u) =0,but by Wairas's Law that equation is
redundant.) Equations (2.6) and (2.8) can be solved for the autarky asset
prices q and the autarky utility level u.
It follows that the gains-from-trade theorem holds: Let ut be the
utility level associated with a trade equilibrium, and let u be the utility
level in an autarky equilibrium. Then we have
(2.9) 11t ￿ u.
The proof is as in the standard trade model (see for instance Dixit and
Norman (1980) or Woodland (1982)). First, we have
(2.10) B(1,qt,ut) =0=ma+ qtza > B(1,qt,u).
The balance of payments in the trade equilibrium is zero (the first equality
in (2.10). This trivially equals the value at trade asset prices qt of the
autarky import a and za of period 1 goods and assets, since these are zero
(the second equality in (2.10)). Zero import gives autarky utility level u.
The minimum import expenditure at trade prices required to reach utility
level u cannot be larger, and will be less if there is some substitution and
trade prices differ from autarky prices (the inequality in (2.10)). Second,
12 If the balance-of-payments function is not differentiable in p or q,
goods and asset imports are not unique. We can then interpret B and Bq as
correspondances. Our results below on the trade pattern do not depend on
whether goods and asset imports are unique or not. For comparative statics
of the Dixit and Woodland (1982) type, it is necessary that the
balance- of- payments function is differentiable.11
since the balance-of-payments function is increasing in utility, (2.9)
follows from (2.10).
We note that the gains-from-trade theorem implies that trade in
complete or incomplete asset markets is better than autarky. However, in
analogy with the case with goods trade only, it does not follow that trade in
moreassets is better than in fewer, unless the prices of all previously
traded assets remain unchanged. The usual terms-of-trade qualification
applies: if the prices of assets previously imported (exported) increase
(decrease) when trade in additional assets is opened up, the negative
terms-of-trade effect may outweigh the gains from trade.
3. World Equilibrium and the Law of Comparative Advantage
Next we shall consider a world equilibrium with trade between the home
and foreign countries. The foreign country has access to a world market with
the same set J of assets as the home country, a representative consumer
entitled to foreign output in the two periods and with a subjective
probability distribution function F*(s), a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function U*(.), a subjective discount factor fl*> 0,and a trade utility
function over period 1 goods (net) import m* and asset (net) import z,
U*(m*,z*), defined by the analog to (2.4). We can then represent the foreign
country by a balance-of-payments function B*(p,q,u*) defined by the analog of
(2.5). A trade equilibrium for the foreign country is then, for given asset
prices qt relative to period 1 goods, the utility level uL and the import m*
and z of period 1 goods and assets that solve the equations analog to (2.6)
and (2.7). An autarky equilibrium for the foreign country is an autarky
asset price vector q* and a utility level u that fulfill the analogs of
(2.6) and (2.8).12
A world eciuilibrium is a vector (qt;mzut;m*,z*,u*t) such that
(qtm,z,ut) and (qt,m*,z*,u*t) are trade equilibria for the home and the
foreign country, respectively, and such that the world asset market and
period 1 goods market are in equilibrium,
(3.la) z+z*=O,and
(3.lb) m +m=
(Theworld market for period 1 goods is in equilibrium whenever the asset
market is in equilibrium, given the budget constraint (2.6) for the home
country and the analog for the foreign country.)
Let m and z be the home country's import of period 1 goods and assets
in a world equilibrium, and let q and q* be home and foreign autarky asset
prices relative to. period 1 goods. Then the law of comparative advantage can
be written on the form
(3.2) (q_q*)z ￿ 0.
It states that on the average, the home country will import assets whose
autarky prices are higher in the home country than in the foreign country.
If only one asset is traded we have an exact relation between autarky asset
prices and the trade pattern: The asset will be imported (and period 1 goods
will be exported) if and only if the autarky price of the asset is higher in
the home country than in the foreign country. If more than one asset is
traded, the law of comparative advantage provides a "tendency" for a
particular asset to be imported if its autarky price is relatively high,13
rather than an exact relation for import in any individual asset.'3
The proof of the law of comparative advantage is as in the standard
trade model (see Deardorff (1980), Dixit and Norman (1980), or Woodland
(1982)). We have
(3.3) m +qz￿ B(1,q,ut) ￿ B(1,q,u) =0.
The first inequality follows since import (m,z) gives utility 11 but is not
necessarily the combination of net import of goods and assets that minimize
expenditure at autarky prices. The second inequality follows since we know
from the gains-from-trade theorem that the home country's utility level ut in
any trade equilibrium cannot fall short of the utility level in autarky u,
and the balance-of-payments function is increasing in utility. The equality
follows from the budget constraint (2.6). An analogous argument for the
13 AsDeardorff (1980) emphasizes, a positive inner product xy =
￿0 does not exactly provide a positive correlation between the J- vectors x =
(xi)
and y(y), unless either =0or Ey =0.This is so, since the
sample correlation coefficient cor(x,y) is proportional to the sample
covariance cov(x,y) and the latter fulfills cov(x,y) =xy
-
Deardorff shows how one can construct correlations in two ways. One way is
to exploit the balance-of-payments constraint. Let qt be the asset prices in
terms of goods in the world equilibrium. Then (3.2) is equivalent to the
statement that the (J+1)-vectors (O,((q-q)/q)) and (m,(qz)) are
positively correlated, since m +qtz=0.The other way is to restrict the
vector of goods and asset prices to be in the unit simplex. Let (p,q) and
(p*,q*) be the home and foreign autarky prices of period 1 goods and assets.
The proof in the next paragraph of the text gives (pp*,qq)(m,z) ￿ 0.
Restricting (p,q) and (p*,q*) to be in the unit simplex then implies that the
(J+1)-vectors ((1,q)/(1÷Jq) -(1,q*)/(1+Eq))
and (m,z) are positively
correlated.
For our purpose it is sufficient to interprete (3.2) as stating that
there is tendency for asset j to be imported into the home country (z >0)
when its home autarky price (measured in oods) is higher than its foreign
autarky price (measured in goods) (q >q).14
foreign country gives
(3.4) + q** 0,
which we by (3.1) can write as
(3.5)
-q* 0.
Addition of (3.3) and (3.5) gives (3.2).
When discussing the the determinants of the trade pattern, one can
either examine the world equilibrium directly, or rely on the law of
comparative advantage. In the former case, one discusses how differences
between countries directly determine the trade pattern, without looking at
the autarky prices. In the latter case, one looks at how differences between
countries determine relative autarky prices, and then from that indirectly
infers the determinants of the trade pattern. In recent discussions of the
trade pattern of goods and factors in the standard trade model, the former
route has usually been chosen (see references mentioned in the Introduction).
In our case, it is convenient to choose the latter route, since we can then
directly apply a standard theory of asset pricing.
4. The Pattern of Trade in Risky Assets
a. The current account and the capital account
Let us state the balance-of-payments relation for the home country in a
trade equilibrium. We can write it as
(4.1) m + qtz =B(1,qt,ut)=0,
stating that the sum of the current account deficit (net import of goods m)
and the capital account deficit (the value of net import of assets qz) is
zero.14 Hence what is being determined in a trade equilibrium is not only
14 Since there is no initial international debt, the trade balance and the
current account coincide.15
the aggregate current and capital account deficits, that is, whether the home
country is a net borrower or lender (the intertemporal trade pattern), but
also the components of the capital account, the disaggregate trade pattern in
individual assets (the interstate trade pattern).
If we would like to concentrate on the intertemporal trade pattern, we
could simplify the model by considering trade in oniy one asset, and even
disregard the effect of uncertainty and incomplete markets by then assuming
that there is no uncertainty and only one state in period 2. This gives us
the simplest possible model to discuss international borrowing and lending.
If we would like to concentrate exclusively on the trade pattern in risky
assets, we could eliminate the first period, and assume that assets are
traded before uncertainty is resolved. This then abstracts from
intertemporal trade and gives us the simplest possible model of trade in
risky assets, "interstate" trade.
As we shall see, in the more general model intertemporal trade and
interstate trade are not independent, and, for instance, the available assets
affect a country's current account. Therefore, we choose to keep the
two-period framework. This also has the advantage that the expressions for
asset prices to be derived are similar to those used in the asset-pricing
literature.
b. Autarky asset prices
The home autarky asset price q of a particular asset j with return
vector Ri(s) is simply given by the marginal rate of substitution between
asset j and period 1 goods of the trade utility function (2.4) at zero import
of goods and assets, where and U denote the partial with




thefamiliar expression of the discounted expected utility of period 2
returns over the marginal utility of period 1 consumption.
It is practical to relate the price of an asset to the real interest
rate on a sure bond, and to the risk measure for the asset. First, define
the autarky real interest rate, r, from the autarky asset price of the sure
bond,
(4.3) q0 =1/(1+r)=
wherewe have substituted (2.la) in (4.2). Second, let us define the autarky
risk measure for asset j, Hi, as
(4.4) 11.i =-Cov[U(y2)RJ/E[U(y2)].
Third, use the rule E[xy] =E[xJE[y]+ Cov[x,y] to rewrite (4.2), and apply




We see that the asset price can be written as the present value of the
difference between its expected return and its risk measure.
The risk measure is proportional to the negative of the covariance
between the marginal utility of period 2 consumption U(y2(s)) and the
returns Ri(s).15 Hence it is positive or negative depending upon whether
period 2 marginal utilities and returns are negatively or positively
15 The risk premium can be defined as the difference between the expected
gross rate of return, and the gross real rate of interest, l÷p.
Then the risk premium is equa' to ll/q and fulfills =
and is hence the negative of the covariance
between the marginal rates of substitution and the ex post rates of return
R (s)/.17
correlated. The risk measure for an asset can be interpreted as a measure of
how risky that asset is relative to the sure bond. If the risk measure is
positive, the asset is riskier than the sure bond. If it is negative, the
asset is less risky than the sure bond.16
It is clear from (4.5) that autarky prices for a given asset may differ
across countries because autarky interest rates, autarky risk measures, or
both, differ across countries. If the subjective beliefs, the subjective
probability distributions over states of the world, differ across countries,
autarky asset prices may differ also because the expected return for a given
asset differs. The analysis below consequently examines the underlying
determinants of differences in autarky interest rates, risk measures, and
expected returns.
c. Trade in risky assets
We shall examine the difference between the home and foreign countries'
autarky asset prices of a given asset j E J. We will look for conditions
under which the home country's autarky asset price exceeds the foreign
country's autarky asset price, and hence under which there will be a tendency
in a world equilibrium for asset j to be imported by the home country and
exported by the foreign country. In the special case where asset j is the
only traded asset we will know for sure that asset j will be imported.
The home autarky asset price of asset j is given by expression (4.2) or
(4.5). The foreign autarky asset price is given by an analogous expression,
16 Note that the sure bond has a sure return, but that the utility value
of the return is risky, since marginal utility itself is risky. Hence there
is nothin paradoxical with assets that are less risky than the sure bond. A
sure-utility bond (in autarky) (j =u)would have returns R11(s) fulfilling
U(y2)R11(s) =1,hence R11(s) =1/U(y2)
for all s.18
with a *denotingforeign output and preferences. Let us now assume that the
subjective probability distribution is the same in the home and foreign
country,
(4.6) F(s) =F*(s)for all s,
so the expected return for a given asset jisthe same in both countries,
(4.7) E[R] =E*[R].
(Below we shall discuss also the case when the subjective probability
distribution differs across countries and (4.7) does not hold.) Let us also
restrict the discussion to assets with positive expected return,
(4.8) E{R] >0.
(If the expected return is negative, we can simply redefine the asset by
changing the sign of its returns.)
If the countries are identical in all respects, the autarky asset
prices will be identical, there is no basis for trade, and zero trade will be
a trade equilibrium. Hence, trade here arises because of differences between
the countries. The countries can differ either with regard to their outputs,
or with regard to their preferences, including their subjective probability
distributions. Let us first consider a situation when the only difference
between the countries is with regard to their outputs.
• (i) Differences in output
Thus, we assume that the foreign country is identical to the home
country in all respects except the outputs, and we drop the
*onthe foreign
countryt s preferences.
Let us first look for conditions under which the home autarky interest
rate is lower than the foreign one,
(4.9) r <r*.
A lower home autarky interest rate implies by (4.5) that for all assets,19
which do not have higher autarky risk measures at borne than abroad, home
autarky prices will be higher, and there is a tendency for the home country
to import all such assets. For assets with a higher autarky risk measure at
home, a lower home autarky real interest rate implies a higher autarky price
but not necessarily higher than the foreign autarky price. Nevertheless, we
may state that a lower home autarky real interest rate contributes to a
tendency to import all assets into the home country, to run a home capital
account deficit, and hence for the home country to be a net lender. This is
true also if the sure bond does not exist. If the only asset traded is the
sure bond, we have an exact result and know for sure that the the home
country will import the sure bond and be a net lender.
We can examine this by looking at the difference in autarky prices of







We would like to know under what conditions this difference is positive. Let
us first assume that the countries differ only with respect to period 1





Sincethe marginal utility of consumption is decreasing, it follows directly
that the home autarky price of the sure bond is higher, and the home autarky
interest rate lower, if the home country has a higher period 1 output,
(4.12) y1 >y1.
This is a standard consumption smoothing result (across countries, though,20
not across time).'7 The home country has relatively more output in period 1,
and it will export goods in period 1 and import goods in period 2, by being a
net lender in period 1.
Let us next assume that period 1 output is the same in the two





Since the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing, it follows
(see Theorem 1 in Lippman and McCall (1981)) that a sufficient condition for
(4.13) to be positive is that home period 2 output is stochastically smaller
than foreign period 2 output, that is, home period 2 output is first-order
stochastically dominated by foreign period 2 output, denoted
(4.14) <1
First-order stochastic dominance of home output by foreign output implies
that the expected value of home output is smaller,
(4.15) Ey2 <
andcan be understood as a generalization of that property.18
This result can also be interpreted as a straight-forward consumption
smoothing result. If the home country has lower expected period 2 output
than the foreign country, it will export goods in period 1 and import goods
17 If both countries have less period 1 output than period 2 output
(average or for each state of the world), home consumption becomes more
unevenly divided over time with trade in the sure bond than in autarky.
18 Let C(.) and G*(.) denote the cumulative distribution functions for the
random variables y and y, respectively. We say that y is stochastically
larger than y, written y >1 y, or G* >1 G, if and and only if G(x) -G*(x)
￿ 0 for all x. Equivalently, we say that y* stochastically dominates y to
the first order. See Lippman and McCall (1981).21
in period 2, by being a net lender in period 1.
Under the assumption that preferences exhibit non-increasing absolute
risk aversion the third-order derivative Uccc of the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function is positive,'9
(4.16) Uccc >0,
and the marginally utility of consumption is a convex function of
consumption. Then, another sufficient condition for (4.13) to be positive
(see Theorem 2 in Lippman and McCall (1981)) is that home period 2 output is
more risky than foreign period 2 output, that is, home period 2 output is
second-order stochastically dominated by foreign period 2 output, denoted
(4.17) Y <2 Y
A special case of this is when home and foreign period 2 output have the same
mean but home output has a larger variance,
(4.18) Var[y2] >Var[y*2],
or when home period 2 output is a mean-preserving spread of foreign period 2
output. Second-order stochastic dominance can be understood as a
generalization of those special cases.2°
19 The measure of local absolut risk aversion is -U/U. We have
(d/dc)(-Ucc(c)/Uc(c)) =Uccc/Uc+ (U/U)2 0, which implies
Uccc ￿ (U)2/U >0.
20 Let G(.) and G*(.) denote the cumulative distribution functions for the
random variables y and y, respectively. We say that y is less risky than
y, written y" >2 " or G >2 G, if and and only if Jx[G(z) -G*(z)]dz￿ 0
for all x. Equivalently, we say that y' stochastically dominates y to the
second order. See Lippman and McCall (1981).22
Intuitively we can understand this result the following way. If
marginal utility is a convex function of consumption, Jensents inequality
implies that increased variance in consumption increases expected marginal
utility, which increases the price of the sure bond and decreases the
interest rate. If the third-order derivative is negative, the opposite
result holds. This is an example of the ambiguity of the effect on saving on
increased riskiness of future income (see the survey by Sandmo (1974)). In
the literature there is general agreement that non-increasing absolute risk
aversion and hence a positive third-order derivative of the von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is the most relevant case. Thus, the
country with the riskier period 2 output will have a tendency to import the
sure bond, and having the riskier period 2 outputs contributes to a tendency
to import all assets and be a net lender.
The results above for the sure bond are summarized in Table 1, row (i),
first column.
Let us next turn to differences in the risk measures. From (4.5) we
see that, for a home autarky real interest not higher than the foreign one, a
lower risk measure at home for asset j implies a higher home autarky asset
price and hence a tendency for asset j to be imported into the home country.
For a home autarky interest rate higher than the foreign one, a lower home
autarky risk measure implies a higher autarky asset price, but not
necessarily higher than in the foreign country. Risk measures are specific
to individual assets and depend on the individual risk characteristics of the
assets. Hence a difference in risk measures for a given asset gives
information about trade in that specific asset; a difference in autarky real
interest rates affect autarky asset prices for all assets and hence gives
information about aggregate asset trade, the capital account.23
Let us assume that autarky interest rates are the same, in order to
focus on differences in autarky risk measures alone. Let us look at
conditions for the home autarky risk measure for asset j to be lower than the
foreign one,
(4.19) ll <ll.
We assume that period 1 output is the same in both countries. From (4.3) and
equal autarky interest rates it follows that E{Uc(y2)]E[Uc(y*2)]. Then,
from (4.4) we see the home autarky risk measure then is lower if and only if
(4.20) Cov[U(y2) R] >Cov[Uc(y*2)RI
that is, if the return is more positively correlated with home marginal
utility of consumption than with foreign marginal utility of consumption.
Since marginal utility of consumption is decreasing in consumption, we
might believe that (4.20) is equivalent to the simple condition that the
return should be more negatively correlated with home period 2 output than
with foreign period 2 output,
(4.21) Cov[y2,R] <Cov[y*2,R].
This is so only in special cases, though. One interesting special case is
when the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function has constant absolute risk
aversion, that is, when
(4.22) U(c) =
withthe constant 'i' = > 0being Arrow-Pratt's measure of absolute
risk aversion. If in addition period 2 outputs and asset return are all
jointly normally distributed,2' it is easy to apply a theorem by Rubinstein
21 Note that, as usual, the assumption of a normal distribution of outputs
is problematic, since it implies that outputs can take negative values with
positive probability.24
(1976)22 and show that the risk measure is simply given by
(4.23) 11 =7Cov[y2,R].
Then, for=7*,Hi < 11 is equivalent to (4.21).23
We conclude that, under the assumption of equal autarky interest rates,
the condition is simply that the return should be more negatively correlated
with home period 2 output than with foreign period 2 output. Then asset j is
less risky in the home country, its autarky risk measure is lower, its
autarky asset price is higher, and there is a tendency that the asset will be
imported by the home country. This result is reported in Table 1, row (1),
the second column.
Let us next consider trade in home and foreign stocks. Because of
symmetry we need only look at foreign stocks. Trade in foreign stocks is of
course affected by differences in autarky interest rates, since these affect
trade in all assets. Suppose now that autarky interest rates are the same.
Then the autarky risk measure is the only source of differences in autarky
asset prices. The condition for the home autarky risk measure for the
foreign stocks to be low, and thus for a tendency for the home country to
import foreign stocks, is, from (4.21),
(4.24) Cov[y2,y*2] < Cov[y*2,y*2] =Var[y*2].
We know that Cov[y2,y*2] ￿ (Var[y2]Var[y*2])h/2. If we assume that home and
foreign period 2 output has the same variance, which from our previous
discussion is in accordance with the assumption of equal autarky interest
rates, we get that a sufficient condition for (4.29) is that home and foreign
22 The theorem says that, if x and y are bivariate normal, under some mild
regularity conditions, Cov[f(x) ,y] =E[f(x)]Cov[x,y].
23 Other cases when (4.20) and (4.21) are approximately equivalent are
discussed in a previous Working Paper version of this paper.25
outputs are less than perfectly positively correlated. Thus, there is a
tendency for the home country to import foreign stocks if the two period 2
outputs are not perfectly correlated. By symmetry, there will be a tendency
for the home country to export home stocks, if home and foreign period 2
outputs are less than perfectly correlated. These results are summarized in
Table 1, row (i), third column.
Let us finally consider Arrow-Debreu securities. Let f(s) denote
either the probability of state s (if the probability distribution is
discrete) or the probability density for state s (if the probability
distribution is absolute-continuous). From (2.lc) and (4.2) the home autarky
price of Arrow-Debreu security s, for all s, will then be
(4.25) q5 =flf(s)U(y2)/U(y1).
When the countries' period 1 outputs are equal, it follows directly that
there is a tendency for Arrow-Debreu security s to be imported if home period
2 outputinstate s is lower than that of the foreign country,
(4.26) y2 <y2.
That is, trade in Arrow-Debreu securities is simply related to the relative
scarcity of period 2 output.
Summary: Table 1, row (i), summarizes the results on output
differences and asset trade. First, in general a low home autarky interest
rate contributes to a tendency for the home country to import all assets and
be a net lender. If the oniy traded asset is a sure bond, it will definitely
be imported by the home country. The home autarky interest rate is low if
home period 1 output is high, or if home period 2 output is stochastically
smaller than foreign period 2 output. The home autarky interest is also low
if preferences exhibit non-increasing absolute risk aversion, and if home
period 2 output is riskier than foreign period 2 output. Second, in general26
a low autarky risk measure for an asset (the product of the risk premium and
the asset price) contributes to a tendency for the home country to import the
asset. The autarky risk measure is low if the asset's returns are more
positively correlated with home autarky period 2 marginal utility than with
foreign autarky period 2 marginal utility If autarky interest rates are
equal, under some restrictions there is a more specific result: If the joint
probability distributions between returns and period 2 outputs are normal and
there is constant absolute risk aversion, the autarky risk measure is low if
the asset's return is more negatively correlated with home output than with
foreign output. Third, if autarky interest rates are equal, there is a
tendency for the home country to import foreign stocks, and export home
stocks, if home and foreign outputs are less than perfectly positively
correlated. Fourth, there is a tendency to import an Arrow- Debreu security
for a particular state if home period 2 output in that state is lower than in
the foreign country.
Next, we assume that outputs are identical in the two countries, but
that preferences differ.24 We shall consider differences in the rate of time
preference (the subjective discount factor), the degree of risk aversion, and
the subjective probability distribution.
(ii) Differences in the rate of time preference
The effect of differences in the rate of time preference is easy to
see. Consider the situation when the home country has a lower rate of time
preference than the foreign country. That is, the home subjective discount
24 We assume y2 =y2,that is, home and foreign period 2 output are
identical and hence perfectly correlated. This is of course not equivalent
to assuming that home and foreign output are i.i.d. In the former case,
claims to home and foreign output are perfect substitutes. In the latter
case, they are not.27
factor is larger,
(4.27) /3>/3*
It follows directly from the definition of the autarky asset price (4.2) that
home autarky asset prices will be higher for all assets (with positive asset
prices) 25
Summary: When the home country has a lower rate of time pref.erence,
there is a tendency for all assets to be imported into the home country, and
for the home country to be a net lender.
(iii) Differences in risk aversion
We would like to consider differences in risk aversion across
countries. This is a bit problematic with expected utility preferences like
(2.2), since in that formulation attitudes towards risk cannot be separated
from intertemporal substitution. Therefore, we choose to use a formulation
according to Selden (1978), which allows such a separation. More precisely,
we assume that there are intertemporal preferences over period 1 consumption,
c1, and certainty equivalent period 2 consumption, c2, according to the
intertemporal utility function
(4.28) U(c1) +/3IJ(c2)
Attitudes towards risk are represented by the risk utility function V(c2), by
which the certainty equivalent period 2 consumption is defined according to
(4.29) V(c2) =E[V(c2(s))],or c2 =V{E[V(c2(s))]}.26
25 We realize from (4.5) that assuming that expected dividends are
positive, (4.10), is not the same thing as assuming that the asset price is
positive, since the risk term may positive andlargerthan the present value
of the expected return.
26 Note that when the interteinporal utility function is identical to the
risk utility function, U() =V(),(4.28) and (4.22) imply the expected
utility preferences (2.2).28
We restrict preferences to have constant absolute risk aversion, that
is,
(4.30) V(c2)e7C2
The trade utility function is defined by U(m,z) =U(y1+m)+
/3U{V{E[V(y2+EjfJR(s))J}}.
It can then be shown that autarky asset
prices q =Uj(OO)/Um(OO)
canstillbe written as in (4.5), with the risk
measure defined by (4.4). With the risk utility function fulfilling (4.30),
and under the assumption that period 2 output and asset returns are jointly
normally distributed, the risk measure is indeed given by (4.23). The
difference is that the autarky price of sure bonds and the autarky real
interest rate are given by
(4.31) q0 =1/(1+r)=flU(y2)/U(y1),




We now assume that the countries differ only with respect to the




First, we examine interest rates. We see immediately front (4.32) that
when the home country is more risk averse, the home certainty equivalent
2
period 2 output, y ,willbe lower than the foreign one, y=E[y]-
7*Var[y2]/2(although home andforeignperiod 2 outputs are identical).
Therefore, the home autarky price of the sure bond will be higher and the
real interest rate will be lower,
27 Weuse that for x normally distributed, E{eX] =(E[x]-aVar[x]/2)29
(4.34) r >r*.
This contributes to a tendency for the more risk averse home country to
import all assets.
Next, we look at the autarky risk measures for a given asset j. In
order to ensure that differences in autarky risk measures are the only reason
for trade, we assume that autarky real interest rates are equal. Since, as
we have seen above, autarky real interest rates differ between the countries,
when the home country is more risk averse and their intertemporal preferences
are identical, we now assume that the subjective discount factors differ so
as to equalize the autarky real interest rates.
The difference in the autarky risk measures equals, by (4.23),
(4.35) II. -ll
=(7.7*)Cov[y2,R.].
It follows from (4.33) that the condition for the home autarky risk measure
to be lower, and for a tendency for asset j to be imported into the home
country, is
(4.36) COV[Y2R] <0.
The return should be negatively correlated with period 2 output. From (4.23)
and (4.36) this also implies that the risk measure should be negative,
(4.37) I1 <0.
Since the sure bond has a zero risk measure, this means that the asset should
be less risky than the sure bond. Thus there is a tendency for the more
risk-averse home country to import assets which are less risky than the sure
bond.
Consider also trade in stocks (claims to period 2 output, Rh(s) =
Rf(s)
=y2).Since period 2 output is positively correlated with itself, it
follows directly from the above analysis that there is a tendency for stocks
to be exported by the more risk-averse home country, since they have a30
positive risk measure and are risker than the sure bond.
Let us finally consider the special case of Arrow-Debreu securities.
From (2.lc) and the definition of the trade utility function it follows that
the home autarky price of a particular Arrow-Debreu security s =y2(since
home and foreign period 2 outputs are now identical, the state can simply be
identified with the period 2 output i each country) is given by
(4.38) q5 =[f(y2)V(y2)/V(;2)]/(1+r).
Assuming that autarky interest rates are equal and using (4.30) and (4.32)





It follows that there is a tendency for the security to be imported for
states for which period 2 output falls short of a given level of period 2
2 2 * 2
output y =E(y)- (-i-y )Var(y)/2. When period 2 output is sufficiently
low, marginal utility in the home country is higher since a higher risk
aversion means that marginal utility decreases more rapidly with consumption.
Summary: The results under the assumption that the home country has a
higher constant absolute risk aversion than the foreign country are
summarized in Table 1, row (iii). First, when home and foreign intertemporal
preferences are identical, the home autarky interest rate is lower, which
contributes to a tendency for the home country to import all assets and be a
net lender. Second, when also subjective discount factors differ so as to
make autarky real interest rates equal, there is a tendency for the more
risk-averse home country to import assets with negative risk measures, that
is, assets that are negatively correlated with period 2 output and less risky
than the sure bond. Third, there is then a tendency for the home country to31
export stocks, since they are assets which are more risky than the sure bond.
Fourth, there is a tendency for the home country to import Arrow-Debreu
securities for states with sufficiently low period 2 output.
(iv) Differences in subjective beliefs
Finally, we consider the case when countries differ only with respect
to their subjective probability distributions, their beliefs. That is, their
subjective probability distributions are no longer identical,
(4.40) F(s)F*(s).
For a given asset j with returns Ri(s) it is no longer true that that
E[R(s)] =JR(s)dF(s)
is equal to E*[R(s)] =
JR(s)dF*(s).
Therefore, the
previous method of expressing the asset price in terms of the real interest
rate and the risk measure is not applicable. It is no longer true that a low
autarky interest rate increases the relative autarky price for all assets.
Hence it is no longer true that a low autarky interest rate contribute to a
tendency for all assets to be imported. A low autarky interest rate implies
only that there is a tendency for the sure bond to be imported.
Assume that preferences are again represented by the expected utility
function (2.2).28 From (4.2) if follows that the difference between the





We can directly apply our results on the autarky interest rates for
differences in period 2 output. First, since marginal utility of consumption
is decreasing, as sufficient condition for a lower home autarky interest rate
is that the home subjective probability distribution over (both countries')
period 2 output, F(y2), (recall that s =y2)is first-order dominated by the
28 That is, the risk utility function in (4.28) is assumed to be identical
to the intertemporal utility function in (4.29).32
foreign subjective probability distribution over (both countries') period 2
output, F*(y2), that is,
(4.42) F <1 F*.
Put differently, the home country has more pessimistic beliefs about both
countries' period 2 output than the foreign country. Second, if the von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function has non-increasing absolute risk
aversion, marginal utility is convex, and a sufficient condition for a lower
home autarky interest rate is that the home subjective probability
distribution over (both countries') period 2 output is second-order dominated
by the foreign subjective probability distribution over (both countries')
period 2 output, that is,
(4.43) F <2 F*.
Put differently, the home country believes that both countries' period 2
output is more risky than the foreign country believes.
For an arbitrary asset j, the difference between the home and foreign
autarky price of asset j is
(4.44) q. -q=f3J(f(y2)..f*(y2))U(y2)R.(y2)dy2/U(yl)
(when the distributions are absolute-continuous; the analog for discrete
distributions is obvious). Expression (4.44) states that there is a tendency
for asset j to be imported into the home country if the probability density
differences, f(s) -f*(s),are positively correlated with the
marginal-utility weighted returns, (U(y2)Rj(s)).29 Thus, we have the rather
obvious result that the home country has a tendency to import an asset when
it assigns higher probabilities than the foreign country to the states where
29 We note that (4.44) being positive is equivalent to a positive
correlation between the f(s) -f*(s)and Uc(Y2)Rj(s) since
J(f(s)f*(s))ds =0(cf. footnote 13 above).33
the assets pays well (where paying well means that the product of marginal
utility of consumption and returns is large).






Letus consider the case with constant relative risk aversion p (and
intertemporal elasticity of substitution i/p),3°
(4.46) U(c) =c1/(1-p),p > 0.
We have that the product of marginal utility and output is U(y2)y2 =
(y2)1P.This product is increasing or decreasing depending upon whether the
degree of relative risk aversion is below or above unity.
Let us consider the case when the degree of relative risk aversion is
above unity (p > 1). Then the product of marginal utility and output is
decreasing and convex, and we have the same two sufficient conditions for a
tendency for the home country to import stocks as we have stated above for
the tendency to import the sure bond, namely that the home country has more
pessimistic beliefs about both countries' period 2 output than the foreign
country ((4.42)), or that home country believes that both countries' period 2
output is more risky than the foreign country believes ((4.43)).
If the degree of relative risk aversion is below unity (p < 1), the
product of marginal utility and output is increasing and concave. Then the
two sufficient conditions are reversed. The home country should have more
optimistic beliefs about both countries' period 2 output than the foreign
country, that is,
(4.47) F >1 F*,
or the home country should believe that both countries' period 2 output is
30 In terms of Selden's formulation, V(.) and U(•) are identical and given
by (4.46).34
less risky than the foreign country believes, that is,
(4.48) F >2 F*.
For the special case of Arrow-Debreu securities, the difference in
autarky prices for security s =y2is simply
(4.49) q -q*=fl(f(y2)f*(y2))u(y2)/u(yl).
e see that there is a tendency to import Arrow-Debreu securities for states
that are assigned larger probability by the home country
(4.50) f(y2) >f*(y2).
Summary: The results on differences in subjective beliefs are
summarized in Table 1, row (iv). First, the home autarky interest rate will
be low, and there will hence be a tendency for the home country to import the
sure bond, if the home country has more pessimistic beliefs about the two
countriest period 2 output than the foreign country, or (when preferences in
the two countries exhibit non-increasing absolute risk aversion) the home
country believes that both countries' period 2 output is more risky than the
foreign country believes. Counter to previous cases, a low home autarky
interest rate does not imply that home autarky prices for other assets are
low, and hence does not necessarily contribute to a tendency to import all
assets. Second, there is, rather obviously, a tendency for the home country
to import an arbitrary asset if the home country assigns higher probabilities
than the foreign country to states for which the marginal utility times
returns is high. Third, the tendency to import stocks (claims to period 2
output) depeilds on the degree of relative risk aversion. If the degree of
relative risk aversion is above (below) unity, there is a tendency for the
home country to import a claim to period 2 output if the home country has
more pessimistic (optimistic) beliefs about the two countries' period 235
output than the foreign country, or if the home country believes the two
countries' period 2 output is more (less) risky than the foreign country.
Fourth, there is a tendency to import Arrow-Debreu securities for states
(period 2 output levels) that are assigned higher probabilities by the home
country than by the foreign country.
5. Conclusions
We have presented a theory of the determinants of the trade pattern in
risky assets, by extending the law of comparative advantage according to
which trade is correlated with autarky price differences. Hence we have
looked at how differences between countries with regard to technology,
endowments and preferences determine autarky asset price differences and
consequently the trade pattern in risky assets. We have derived results on
the effect of differences in (i) output/endowments, (ii) rate of time
preferences, (iii) risk aversion, and (iv) subjective beliefs on the trade
pattern in arbitrary risky assets as well as the special cases of sure bonds,
stocks, and Arrow-Debreu securities. The results have been summarized in
highlighted paragraphs at the end of each subsection of section 4, and they
are also summarized in Table 1.
We realize from our results that, when asset markets are incomplete,
overall capital account deficits or surpluses depend on what assets are
available for international trade. For instance, consider the case when
countries differ only with respect to the stochastic properties of their
output. If there is trade in claims to one country's output oniy, whether a
country is a net borrower or lender depends on whether it is claims to its
output or another country's output that is traded (as we saw above, a country
has a tendency to export claims to its own output and import claims to other
countries' output). It follows that in a monetary model with incomplete36
markets, it will matter for the capital flows what currency available assets
are nominated in, since the real return on the assets will be affected by
price level risk.
The results derived have been interpreted in terms of trade in risky
assets between countries. Obviously, the model and its results can also be
interpreted in terms of trade in risky assets between individuals.31
An important simplifying characteristic of our approach is that an
asset is defined in terms of an exogenously given vector of next period's
gross real returns across states of the world. We share this characteristic
with most of the finance literature. Most assets, however, have gross real
returns endogenously determined. For instance, the returns on equity, being
claims to profits, are clearly endogenously determined when production
decisions and goods and factor prices are endogenously determined. Even for
an asset with exogenously given returns in terms of a particular good, the
appropriate "real" return depends on endogenous relative goods prices when
there are many goods. With many periods, the gross return in next period on
a long-term asset is the sum of next period's endogenous asset price and the
"direct" return/dividend (which may or may not also be endogenous).
Generally, for most assets the stochastic properties of the gross real
returns are endogenously determined and part of the equilibrium, and the
stochastic properties differ between trade equilibria and autarky equilibria.
31Varian(1987) analyzes the effect on the volume of asset trade of
differences of opinion between agents in a model with trade in Arrow- Debreu
securities, using what we have called in the Introduction the "direct"
approach. Our analysis of the effect of differences in subjective beliefs on
the trade pattern in risky assets, usin the law of comparative advantage,
can hence be seen as complementary to his.37
From the point of view of our approach, if an asset has one gross real return
vector in a trade equilibrium, and another gross real return vector in
autarky, it is actually two different assets.
Hence, since most assets have endogenous gross returns, it may seem
that our approach with exogenously specified gross returns should have very
restricted applicability. We argue, however, that our approach can be used
also to predict the trade pattern for assets with endogenously determined
returns. The trick is to identify a particular asset's (endogenously
determined)gross real return vector across states of the world in a trade
equilibrium, and then ask how a hypothetical asset with such a gross real
return vector (taken to be exogenous andhence held fixed) would be priced in
autarky.The home and foreign autarky asset prices of thehypothetical asset
willthen predict thedirection of trade in the particular asset considered.
Takingthe aboveinto account, it ispossible to extend the analysis to
manygoods and to more than two periods. As in the standard trade theory,
the predictions of the law of comparative advantage are weaker for individual
assets and goods, the more assets and goods there are.
The analysis has been restricted to a barter model without any money.
It is clearly desirable to include the possibility of nominal assets and to
analyze also the trade pattern in such assets. Extending the model to
include money and other nominal assets raises several issues, though. One
issue, already mentioned above, is that the appropriate gross real returns in
trade equilibrium on any nominal asset considered have to be identified. We
have already mentioned that the real return on nominal assets will depend on
price level risk, which in turn will depend on countries' monetary policies.
For instance, different exchange rate regimes and corresponding different38
monetary policies will affect the trade pattern in nominal assets and hence
overall capital flows. Svensson (1987) discusses these issues and the
internatiollal trade pattern for nominal assets within the context of the law
of comparative advantage. Persson and Svensson (1987) examine the effect of
different exchange rate regimes and corresponding exchange rate variability
on capital movements within the direct approach to the determination of the
trade pattern in risky assets. Another issue is that the law of comparative
advantage uses the gains-from-trade theorem, which does not necessarily hold
if there are domestic distortions in autarky. Hence it will be crucial for
the analysis how money is modeled, more precisely whether money is modeled as
having real effects and possibly being distortionary, or whether money is
modeled as being neutral.39
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